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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT’S
ROLE IN DETERMINING
NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF
OBLIGATIONS OWED TO A
FORMER SPOUSE

The policy in favor of giving the
honest debtor a fresh start in
bankruptcy is subordinate to the
more compelling interests of the
debtor’s family members in con
tinuing to receive financial sup
port. This ranking of priorities is
manifested by an exception to
discharge that applies to any debt
owed to a spouse, former spouse,
or child of the debtor, for ali
mony, maintenance, or support in
connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree or
other court order, or property set
tlement agreement.'
♦ Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Con
ference.
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead,
New York; associate member of the Na
tional Bankruptcy Conference.
This column is based on material pre
pared by the authors for the forthcoming
revised edition of their book. Bankruptcy
Law Manual, to be published by Warren,
Gorham & Lamont in December 1985.
' 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). This is the only
type of debt that may not be discharged in
a chapter 13 debt adjustment case. See 11
U.S.C. § 1328. This exception was ex-

The exception for alimony,
maintenance, and support obliga
tions does not apply if the obliga
tion is assigned to another entity
by the debtor’s family member or
former spouse.^ However, as a
result of a 1981 amendment to the
Code, obligations of this nature
remain nondischargeable if they
are assigned to the state pursuant
to Section 402(a)(26) of the Social
Security Act as a condition for
eligibility for support payments
from the Federal Aid to Families
with Dependent Children Fund.^
panded in 1984 to apply to court orders
other than divorce decrees. 1984 Amend
ments § 454(b). In cases that were com
menced prior to October 8, 1984, a debt for
child support that did not arise from a sep
aration agreement, divorce decree, or
property agreement is dischargeable. See
In re Bruner, 43 Bankr. 143 (E.D. Mo.
1984).
^ 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A); see In re
Brunhoff, 4 Bankr. 381, 382 (S.D. Fla.
1980) (holding that the debtor’s past-due
alimony obligations beeame dischargeable
after the death of his ex-wife). “ The debt
has been assigned to another entity, the
ex-wife’s personal representative, by op
eration of law and is not, therefore, non
dischargeable under the provisions of the
Code.” See also In re Fields; 23 Bankr.
134 (D. Colo. 1982) (child support arrears
became dischargeable when the debtor’s
wife filed liquidation petition, thus effec
tuating assignment of child support claim
to the trustee of her bankruptcy estate.
^ Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 863 (Om
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
§ 2334); see/n re Stovall, 721 F.2d. 1133 (6th
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This provision was amended fur
ther in 1984 to include as nondischargeable any obligation of this
nature that had been assigned to
the federal, state, or local govemment.“ Moreover, courts have
held that a debtor’s obligations
in the nature of alimony, mainte
nance, or support are nondischargeable it owed to a third party
when there has not been assign
ment of the debt by the spouse.
For example, the court in In re
French^ held that the debtor’s ob
ligation imposed by a state court
order to pay legal fees directly to
his former spouse’s attorney in
connection with a divorce pro
ceeding was a nondischargeable
support obligation even though it

was payable to someone other
than his ex-wife.*
Nondischargeable Alimony
Obligations vs. Dischargeable
Property Settlement Obligations

The Bankruptcy Code makes it
clear that the mere labeling of an
obligation as one for alimony,
maintenance, or support will not,
in and of itself, render it nondis
chargeable. This often leads to
litigation concerning the fine dis
tinction between nondischarge
able alimony obligations and dis
chargeable property settlefnent
obligations, an issue that has been
puzzling the courts for many
years. Legislative history relating
to the Code indicates that federal
bankruptcy law will govern the
Cir. 1983) (holding that an assignment to determination of whether a debt is
the state of child support obligations pur in the nature of alimony, maintesuant to an Illinois state statute rendered
the debt nondischargeable because the
state statute was consistent with § 402
§ 2334); see/n re Stovall, 721 F.2d. 1133 (6th
U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)). Several courts have
held that its application is prospective and
affects only those bankruptcy cases com
menced on or after August 13, 1981. These
courts have held that in cases commenced
under the Bankruptcy Code prior to Au
gust 13, 1981, all obligations to pay sup
port that have been assigned to the state as
a prerequisite for receiving public assis
tance are dischargeable. S te in re Flamini,
19 Bankr. 303 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982);
Heldt V. State, 17 Bankr. 519 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1982). But see/« re Reynolds, 726
F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
1981 amendment is applicable to cases that
were pending at the time of enactment).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), as amended
by 1984 Amendments § 454 (applicable in
cases filed on or after October 8, 1984).
5 9 Bankr. 464 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).

See also; e.g.. In re Williams, 703
F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Calhoun,
715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983);/« re Spong,
661 F.2d (2d Cir. 1981); In re Knabe, 8
Bankr. 53 (S.D. Ind. 1980); In re Bell, 5
Bankr. 653, 655 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (“ at
torney fee dischargeability . . . must rise
or fall with the primary debt” ); cf. In re
Lewis, 39 Bankr. 842 (W.D.N.Y. 1984)
(court would limit nondischargeability of
debts payable to third parties to attorney
fees only); In re Delillo, 5 Bankr. 692 (D.
Mass. 1980); see also In re Wolfe, 26
Bankr. 731 (Kan. 1982) (debtor’s obliga
tion on an auto loan, incurred when he
purchased a car as a gift for his former
spouse, was in the nature^of child support
and was nondischargeable despite absence
of a hold harmless agreement). See 124
Cong. Ree. HI 1096 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1978).
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nance, or support.’ This is a de
parture from the previous practice
of resorting to state law on this
issue.® The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit has stated that
“ the proper test of whether the
payments are alimony lies in proof
of whether it was the intention of
the parties that the payments be
for support rather than as a prop
erty settlement.” ® In an attempt
to establish more concrete guide
lines for distinguishing between
aliniony, maintenance, and sup
port, and obligations in the na
ture of a property settlement, the
bankruptcy court in In re N e l
son^'’ listed eleven factors usually
taken into consideration when de
termining, the true intentions of
the parties or the state divorce
court:

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

1. Whether the obligations of
payment terminate on the
’ See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 364 (1977); see also In re Wil
liams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1056 (8th Cir. 1983)
(court of appeals wrote that whether a debt
is a support obligation or property settle
ment “ is a question of federal bankruptcy
law, not state law” ); In re French, 9
Bankr. 464^468 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (the court
noted that this issue “ is strictly a matter of
federal law” ).
“ See, e.g.. In re Waller, 494 F,2d 447
(6th Cir. 1974), in which the federal court
looked to Ohio law to determine whether a
particular obligation was one to pay
alimony.
’ Melichar v. Ost, 661 F.2d 300, 303 (4th
Cir. 1981), ceri, denied, 102 S. Ct. 1974
( 1982); see also Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d
1314 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Eisenberg, 13
Bankr. 1001 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
'» 16 Bankr. 658 (M.D. Tenn. 1981),
rev'd in pari on other grounds, 20 Bankr.
1008.

9.

10.
11.
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death of either spouse or on
remarriage of the spouse benefitted by the payments;
Whether the obligation termi
nates when the dependent chil
dren reach maturity age or are
otherwise emancipated;
Whether the payments are to
be made directly to the spouse;
The relative earnings of the
parties;
Evidence that the spouse relin
quished rights in property in re
turn for the payment of the ob
ligations;
The length of the parties’ mar
riage and the number of depen
dent children;
The document itself and any in
ferences that can be drawn
from placement of specific
provisions within the docu
ment;
Whether the debt was incurred
for the immediate living ex
penses of the spouse;
Whether the payments were in
tended for the economic safety
of the dependent(s);
Whether the obligation is en
forceable by contempt; and
Whether the payments are
payable in installments over a
substantial period of time.

It is common for a separation
agreement or divorce decree to
incorporate the husband’s prom
ise to hold the wife harmless
from debts incurred during the mar
riage. Again, bankruptcy courts
may be required to determine
whether such obligations are
actually in the nature of nondischargeable alimony, maintenance.
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or support. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has sug
gested four factors that might as
sist bankruptcy courts in discern
ing the true intention of the parties
or the divorce court with respect
to a husband’s promise to hold a
wife harmless from debts incurred
during the marriage: (1) whether
the settlement agreement includes
provision for payments to the ex
spouse; (2) whether there is any
indication that the hold-harmless
provision was intended to balance
the relative incomes of the par
ties; (3) whether the hold-harmless clause is in the midst of provi
sions allocating property; and (4)
whether the hold-harmless provi-'
sion describes the character and
method of payment.“

In re Calhoun: A Landmark

Decision
In a 1983 landmark decision
that has significantly altered the
bankruptcy court’s role involving
domestic relations issues in the
Sixth Circuit, the court of appeals
in In re Calhoun held that a fac
tual finding that the debtor’s as
sumption of joint debts in a sep
aration agreement incorporated
into a divorce decree was in
ten d ed by the parties to be in the
'U n re Woods, 561 F.2d 27, 30 (7th Cir.
1977). In a subsequent case, the court of
appeals indicated that “ the Woods factors,
however, are not exhaustive.” In re Coil,
680 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1982).
715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).

nature of alimony, support, or
maintenance does not resolve
the dischargeability question, but
merely begins the judicial analysis.
“ If the bankruptcy court finds, as
a threshold matter, that assump
tion of the debts was intended as
support it must next inquire
whether such assumption has the
effect- of providing the support
n ecessa ry to ensure that the daily
needs of the former spouse and
any children of the marriage are
sa tisfie d . " I f the debtor’s obli
gation to assume joint debts is not
necessary to provide daily neces
sities, such as food, housing, and
transportation, the inquiry ends
and the debtor’s obligation to hold
the former spouse harmless is’dis
charged. If the debtor’s obligation
was intended to be in the nature of
support and has the effect of pro
viding necessary support, the
bankruptcy court must then de
termine whether the amount of
support represented by the as
sumption is “ not so excessive that
it is manifestly unreasonable
under traditional concepts of sup
port.” Justifying this inquiry as
an application of the “fresh start”
concept underlying federal bank
ruptcy law, the court of appeals
emphasized that the inquiry is
“limited to whether the amount
agreed to is manifestly unreason
able in view of the earning power
and financial status of the debtor
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spouse.” ** If the debt assumption
is excessive, the bankruptcy court
should set a reasonable limit of
nondischargeability of that obliga
tion.

vorce court,” it remains to be
seen whether the Supreme Court
or courts in other circuits will tol
erate such an extensive intrusion
by bankruptcy courts into issues
concerning the reasonableness
of support provisions.*’ As one
bankruptcy court noted, “the C al
houn rule is an elegant formula
tion, probably destined for cita
tion as a seminal work in the new
federal common law of domestic
relations, but is fraught with
forebodings for bankruptcy judges
and divorce practitioners'.” ** The
same court also observed that the
Calhoun decision “ signals a sig
nificant involvement of ban
kruptcy courts in domestic rela
tions, matters heretofore thought
to fall within the sole province of
the state courts.” *®

The Problems That Remain
The Calhoun decision raises
several troublesome questions.
First, will its holding be extended
to other forms of support other
than the debtor’s âgreement to as
sume joint debts? Several bank
ruptcy courts have extended its
reasoning to all forms of alimony,
maintenance, and support.** Sec
ond, although the court in C al
houn stated that the bankruptcy
court does not sit as a “ super diId. The court indicated that the debt
or’s present and foreseeable ability to pay,
at the time the debts were assumed, is the
focus of the inquiry. The amount exceed
ing this ability should not be characterized
as support. However, if the circumstances
of the debtor have changed since the time
the debts were assumed, the court may
consider the current ability to pay. Id. at
Ilio n .ll.
“ S ts In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215 (W.D.
Ky. 1985);/« re Elder, 48 Bankr. 414 (W.D.
Ky. 1985).
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” Cf. Caswell v. Dang, 757 F.2d 608 (4th
Cir. 1985) (holding that a chapter 13 plan
may not include provisions affecting past
due child support obligations). “ The state
court’s determination respecting the rights
of the parties in these areas of state con
cern shoyld not be disturbed by federal
bankruptcy courts.” Id. at 611.
In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 216 (W.D.
Ky. 1985).
Id. at 225.
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